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Abstract
Models of vintage-capital learning by doing predict an initial fall in productivity after
the introduction of new technology. This paper examines the impact of new technology
on plant-level productivity in the Japanese steel industry in the 1950s and 1960s. The
introduction of the basic oxygen furnace was the greatest breakthrough in the steel
reﬁning process in the last century. We estimate production function, taking account of
the diﬀerences in technology between the reﬁning furnaces owned by a plant. Estimation
results indicate that a more productive plant was likely to adopt the new technology,
and that the adoption would be timed to occur right after the peak of the productivity
level achieved with the old technology. We have found that the adoption of the new
technology primarily accounted not only for the industry’s productivity slowdown in
the early 1960s, but also for the industry’s remarkable growth in the post-war period.
These results are robust to endogeneity in the choice of input and technology.
Keywords: learning by doing; vintage capital; technology adoption; TFP; endogeneity; sam-
ple selection
JEL: D24, L61, O14, O33.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
An important source of the U.S. productivity slowdown observed around 1973 and afterwards was
the introduction of new technology embodied in capital goods (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 2001).
Numerous theoretical models of technology adoption indicate that when plants switch to new
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1production technology, their productivity initially falls and thereafter gradually rises. The initial
productivity drop implies that the experience obtained through operating old technology does not
fully transfer to new technology. The rise in productivity suggests that learning by doing occurs
after the technology adoption.1 Theoretical research and simulation results have indicated that
the diﬀusion of new technology can explain a signiﬁcant part of productivity slowdown observed
in the U.S. and other industrial countries (surveyed in Greenwood and Jovanovic, 2001). On the
other hand, there is a severe lack of empirical research identifying the existence of and measures
the magnitude of the impact of new technology adoption on productivity. Such empirical research
would help us to assess the validity of the models used in the literature to quantify aggregate
productivity growth as propelled by technological improvement embodied in capital. Accurate
measurement of the productivity impact requires plant-level information that identiﬁes the vintage
of capital investment. The data set for such a study should distinguish between the investment that
reﬂects the adoption of new technology, and that which reﬂects the expansion of old technology.
This paper investigates the eﬀects on productivity of new technology adoption, using the plant-
level data pertaining to the Japanese steel industry. In the 1950s and 1960s, many ﬁrms updated
their reﬁning furnace technology, shifting from the conventional open-hearth furnace (OHF) to the
basic oxygen furnace (BOF). The share of output produced by BOF expanded from 4.1% in 1957 to
83.4% in 1968, a diﬀusion rate faster than that found in other innovations.2 The introduction of the
BOF was praised as “unquestionably one of the greatest technological breakthroughs in the steel
industry during the twentieth century” (Hogan, 1971: 1543), and provides us with an ideal case for
studying the impact of new technology adoption. The period of rapid spread of BOF technology
interestingly coincides with that of the remarkable growth Japan experienced after the devastation
of the World War II. The steel industry, in particular, expanded its production more than fourfold
over the decade between 1953 and 1964, raising Japan to the status of the world’s largest steel
exporter in 1969. Our unique furnace/plant-level data set covers the inputs and output of each
furnace type, timing and size of new capital installation, and old capacity expansion. The data
let us estimate production function by furnace technology, and measure the change in productivity
and output growth before and after the adoption of the new technology.
Our estimation results indicate a greater than 14 percent decline in productivity caused by the
obsolescence of OHF-speciﬁc experience, upon adoption of BOF technology. The rapid diﬀusion of
BOF may initially appear at odds with the ﬁnding of the large obsolescence of experience with old
technology. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) and Parente (1994) have indeed proposed models whereby
1Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) point out that R&D investment is another source of productivity gains. How-
ever, this factor probably was insigniﬁcant in the case of the Japanese steel industry, because the Japanese merely
adopted, but did not develop the new furnace technology.
2See, for example, Gruber (1991).
2new technology diﬀusion slows with an increase in technology adoption cost. We have noted that
the rapid diﬀusion of BOF in Japan was due to the concerted eﬀorts of the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) of Japan to hold down the license fee for BOF use. This
government intervention lowered a barrier to Japanese steel makers accessing the more eﬃcient
technology, and ultimately helped them achieve the steel “miracle” of the 1950s and 1960s. This
paper indeed ﬁnds that had the BOF not been adopted, output growth would have been averaged
only 2.3 percent annually, in contrast with the actual 15.2 percent growth achieved from 1957 to
1968.
Two empirical studies examine the eﬀect of new technologies on productivity. Huggett and
Ospina (2001) analyze output growth using data pertaining to major equipment purchases from
a plant-level survey of the Colombian manufacturing sector. Sakellaris (2004) studies the period
of rapid capital adjustment in U.S. Census data. Both papers use a large adjustment in capital
as a proxy for new technology adoption. This method is imperfect, being unable to diﬀerentiate
new technology adoption from old technology acquisition, and thus unable to identify vintage-
speciﬁc learning by doing. This paper indeed ﬁnds that in examining the history of the Japanese
steel industry, incorporating the diﬀerence in capital vintage is essential in production function
estimation, and that neglecting to do so overestimates total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
The present paper makes two additional extensions to this literature. First, we control for omitted
variable bias in the construction of TFP, and also deal with possible selection bias due to the choice
of technology. Controlling for these econometric problems, we ﬁnd that more productive plants
were more likely to adopt new technology, doing so right after their productivity levels peaked
with the old technology. Second, our measure of output and input are in terms of quantity rather
than value added. We are thus free of a “deﬂator” problem in estimating the production function.
This problem could be severe in studying the Japanese steel market, in which only a handful of
dominant major ﬁrms operated under minimal competitive pressure from abroad. As a result, this
paper identiﬁes a productivity decline of greater than 14 percent upon new technology adoption,
whereas Huggett and Ospina (2001) and Sakellaris (2004) ﬁnd the ranges of 1.7-4 percent, and 3-9
percent, respectively.
This paper also contributes to the literature concerning learning by doing through conducting
production function estimation. Few empirical studies have examined whether learning persists
within organizations, and the concept of organizational forgetting — the hypothesis that a ﬁrm’s
knowledge stock depreciates over time — has been proposed. Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990)
and Benkard (2000) ﬁnd support for this hypothesis as it applies to shipbuilding during World
War II, and in commercial aircraft production, respectively. Although these papers informally
attribute the forgetting to rapid job turnover or highly variable production costs, no papers on
3organizational forgetting identify the actual sources of the forgetting. If an instance of technology
adoption indeed leads to a fall in productivity, it could be considered as a source of organizational
forgetting. This paper’s contribution to the literature is to focus exclusively on one possible inﬂu-
ence on organizational forgetting, i.e., new technology adoption, and formally assess its impact on
productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the features of the Japanese steel market
in the 1950s and 1960s that have an important bearing on the subsequent modeling and estimation
framework. The section emphasizes the importance of technology-speciﬁc learning in furnace use,
and describes the steel reﬁning process. Section 3 delineates the estimation framework used to
measure productivity in the reﬁning stage of steel production. Section 4 presents the estimation
results. The learning-by-doing eﬀect is found to be signiﬁcant, and estimates obtained by the proxy
method indicate the successful elimination of endogeneity. Based on the estimation results, Section
5 analyzes industry and plant-level productivity, and examines the impact of the new technology
adoption on TFP and industry output. Section 6 concludes, and is followed by technical and data
appendices.
2 An Overview of the Post-war Japanese Steel Market
Japan’s remarkable growth from the 1950s through the 1970s has been well studied by economists
and policy makers. Japan’s experience is a prototype of the so-called “ﬂying goose model,” in which
industries experienced rapid growth one after another, with a lead industry providing external
beneﬁts to subsequent industries, helping them take oﬀ. In the context, the steel industry was
the “lead goose” in Japan’s marvelous growth after the World War II, followed by the TV and
automobile industries.
Most Japanese steel in the early 1950s was produced by integrated steel manufacturers. In-
tegrated steel works transform raw materials (iron ore and coking coal) into pig iron in a blast
furnace. Pig iron is then transformed into crude steel in a second furnace by removing carbon
and other elements. The prevalent technology used in this second, or “reﬁning,” stage at the time
was the open-hearth furnace (OHF), which blows air from the bottom of a steel shell through the
molten pig iron. The air raises the temperature in the pig iron and oxidizes the carbon in it. In
the late 1950s the OHF began loosing ground rapidly, being replaced by the basic oxygen furnace
(BOF). According to Hogan (1971), the introduction of the BOF was “unquestionably one of the
greatest technological breakthroughs in the steel industry during the twentieth century” (p. 1543).
A major advantage of the BOF was that it reﬁned molten iron and scrap charge into steel in about
45 minutes, a sharp reduction from the 6 hours normally required by the OHF at the time. Fur-
thermore energy costs declined appreciably with use of the BOF. Electricity was necessary fuel to
4operate the furnaces. Table 2 shows that the average electricity consumption per million ton of
steel production with the BOF was 20 kWh, whereas 30 kWh for the OHF and 890 kWh for the
electric furnace. Crude oil was used mostly for the OHF, and is thus included in the estimation
explained in Section 4.
Use of the electric furnace (EF) became widespread with the assurance of adequate electric
power at industrial rates. The size of the EF was small: according to our data, on average, the
EF was one quarter the size of the OHF, and one ﬁfth the size of the BOF (Table 2). The EF
used mostly scrap as its material input, and did not require molten pig iron directly from a blast
furnace. The EF thus made it possible for non-integrated companies (i.e., the companies with
no blast furnace) to enter the steel industry with minimal capital investment, and for integrated
companies to expand production capacity incrementally. These three types of steel reﬁning furnaces
produced crude steel of homogenous quality. While we are mostly interested in the OHF and BOF,
our estimation also incorporates the EF so as not to select biased samples regarding this dimension.
Upon the adoption of BOF, the MITI formed a group of Japanese steel makers, and negotiated
over a technology license as a single buyer with the patent holder, Brassert Oxygen Technik, A.G.
An agreement was reached whereby a set fee of $1.4 million would be collectively paid for the
technology by all the Japanese adopting ﬁrms. This licensing fee turned out to be incredibly cheap
for the Japanese. According to Lynn (1982):
Each ﬁrm was to be assessed a constantly declining royalty per ton of steel, so that
each would have paid the same amount per ton of steel produced by the time the
license expired in 1970. [...] During the fourteen-year period of the license, Japan
produced approximately 320 million tons of BOF steel–so the license cost per ton of
steel produced came to about 0.36 cents. Firms in North America were asked to pay
royalties ranging from 15 cents to 25 cents and more per ton of steel produced. (83-84)
Table 1 presents the number of plants and output share, by furnace technology, further break-
ing down the data by ﬁrm size. The top six ﬁrms were Yawata, Fuji, Nihon Kokan, Kawasaki,
Sumitomo, and Kobe in order of production share. This order did not change during the 1956-1968
study period, the period in which most BOF adoption occurred in the Japanese market. Most
plants owned multiple furnaces of the same vintage: Table 2 indicates more than 4 OHF and 2
BOF furnaces per plant. We account for this feature of the data in the estimation.
Looking at the material presented in Table 1, we note that ﬁrms owned multiple plants, and
that plants operated more than one reﬁning technology. According to Table 1, the average number
of ﬁrms in the industry over the 1956-1968 period was 35; the average number of plants was 58,
and the average plant had 1.4 furnace types. The share of the output produced by the largest ﬁrms
rose from 78 to 86 percent in this period. The six large ﬁrms owned more plants and furnaces,
5and experienced a more drastic output shift from OHF to BOF technology: the BOF share of the
industry output rose from 4.5 to 83.4 percent, mostly substituting for the decline of the OHF share
from 87.2 to 7.5 percent. This BOF diﬀusion rate appears fast, relative to those of other innovations
reported in the literature. For example, Jovanovic and Lach (1996) cites a study of 265 innovations
that found that it took 41 years on average for the output share of a new technology to rise from 10
percent to 90 percent — a marked contrast to 15 years for our Japanese BOF case. Since each plant
presumably chose the most proﬁtable technology to maximize the discounted stream of proﬁts, our
observation of BOF diﬀusion may necessitate our correcting for self-selection in technology choice
in the production function estimation. About 80 percent of the EF output is attributed to smaller
ﬁrms, as expected in view of EF capacity. Four ﬁrms ceased to exist in this thirteen-year period,
two of which were acquired by large ﬁrms. The infrequent exiting of ﬁrms from the sample leads
us to believe that the sample selection caused by plants exit is not a major concern regarding our
data.
Although one may think that a furnace is not a very sophisticated piece of equipment, Hogan
(1971) and Japan Steel Association (1971) note that it was only through extensive furnace use
that detailed knowledge was gained about furnace operation, maintenance frequency, and overhaul
requirements. In a number of instances, closer control of molten metal temperature through better
sampling was necessary to improve fuel eﬃciency in furnace operation by reducing variations be-
tween heats. Experiential knowledge based on OHF operation was largely inadequate to anticipate
the reliability of the BOF or EF operations (Lynn, 1982: 56, 133). In addition, the eﬃciency of
furnace operation after prolonged use or with aging was diﬃcult to predict: frequent sampling
during the heats helped maintain eﬃcient production of crude steel, and led to new practices that
increased furnace productivity. The steel production experience described above suggests the exis-
tence of learning by doing, or learning by using (Rosenberg, 1982) in the operation of a particular
furnace technology. The learning experience gained in operating a particular furnace was not likely
transferable to other furnace technologies, and since eﬃcient operation depends on many plant-
speciﬁc conditions, knowledge through learning activity may also have been plant speciﬁc, and not
shared by others.3 We test this spillover hypothesis in Section 4.
3Japanese steel makers attempted to combine their eﬀorts to control furnace operations by creating an integrated
computerized system in the 1960s, ﬁnally succeeding at this in 1973 (Japan Industry Newspaper, 16 October 1976).
This example indicates how knowledge transfer between ﬁrms was still problematic in the study period. Ohashi
(2004) notes a similar ﬁnding regarding blast-furnace operations in the Japanese steel market.
63 Measuring Productivity
Our empirical goal is to compare the productivity between plants and across time, while explicitly
considering diﬀerences in furnace technology. To do so, we need estimates from the production
function that describes the steel reﬁning process. Considering that the three furnace technologies,
OHF, BOF, and EF, feature substantially diﬀerent operational characteristics, we allow for pro-
duction function parameters to diﬀer in terms of technology. The description of the industry in
the previous section reveals that learning by doing was an important feature of furnace operations.
The production function thus incorporates learning by doing, as well as other control variables such
as capacity size and input measure.
Learning by doing explains why extensive use of a particular furnace type leads to more eﬃcient
production. Section 2 describes how the knowledge gainedthroughlearning by doing was technology
speciﬁc, i.e., geared to a speciﬁc furnace type, and was not transferable to the operation of the other
types of furnaces. Lynn (1982) also describes how “hard-gained skills were made obsolete with
demise of the open hearth” and by the introduction of the BOF. The learning by doing process,
however, is not directly observable, and is thus diﬃcult to measure. Following the treatment in
the literature (for example, Spence, 1984), we use cumulative output level as a proxy for a plant’s
learning level for a particular technology s (s i se i t h e rO H F ,B O F ,o rE F ) .L e tZs
i be plant i’s





it−1 is steel output of furnace s in plant i at time t−1. Although the production knowledge
was not shared across s, the knowledge possibly spilled over between plants within a ﬁrm. We
thus allow for the possibility of within-ﬁrm spillover in Section 4. The plant-level data are ﬁrst
available for 1947, so we assume that furnace experience begins to accumulate after the war, taking
the experience in 1946 to be zero (i.e., Zs
i,1946 =0 ). Note that we chose to start the study period in
1957, when the steel production had recovered to the wartime peak achieved in 1943 (See Figure
1). Our estimate of the learning eﬀects are thus based on the knowledge level newly acquired in
the postwar period.
All three types of furnaces studied produce crude steel, a homogeneous product. Our econo-
metric model of the production function assumes the following Cobb-Douglas form (all variables












it is annual output (in tons) for furnace s at plant i in year t. The production function
comprises a number of input variables. The vector of fuels and labor input is xs
it: all furnaces
used electricity as an energy source, and the OHF used oil in addition. The major inputs for steel
making were molten pig iron and scrap, but we do not include them in (1). The steel-production
7process transforms pig iron and scrap directly into crude steel, so the inputs and output have a
one-to-one mapping: in this paper, we are more interested in analyzing how eﬃciently the furnaces
completed this transformation process. The capacity size of furnace s is indicated by ks
it,a n dzs
it is
the logarithm of Zs
it. While we do not have precise data on capacity utilization, we expect that the
electricity consumption in xs
it approximates the variable well. It is important to include zs
it in (1).
If we do not have this regressor, the coeﬃcients of ks
it would be overestimated, since we ﬁnd high
correlation between ks
it and zs
it (the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.65 on average across s). Of course,
if the vintage-capital learning by doing were not important in steel reﬁning, we would not observe
signiﬁcance in βs
z. The base model also contains technology- and year-speciﬁc components (τs
and λt, respectively). We use dummies to control for the speciﬁc components. The year dummies
control for aggregate industry shocks in the variables. The inclusion of technology dummies serves
to control for eﬃciency diﬀerences of production. Omitted variables add to the content of the last
two terms in (1), and create the likely source of an upward bias in βs
x, as discussed below.
Note that ys
it is measured in terms of output quantity, not value added. Many studies use value
added, as deﬂated by a common industry deﬂator, under the implicit assumption that a condition
of perfect competition holds for the product market. If this assumption is violated, it is diﬃcult to
obtain unbiased estimates of production-function parameters without use of quantity measures of
output (Klette and Griliches, 1996).
The production function (1) contains two mean-zero errors, which are not known by the econo-
metrician. We divide the errors into two, depending on whether or not they are known by the
producer. We assume that ωs
it represents productivity as known by the producer, and that εs
it is
the error introduced by measurement, data collection, and computational procedure that is not fore-
seen by the producer. Productivity unobserved by the econometrician may create two endogeneity
problems: endogeneity in input choice, and endogeneity in technology choice.
Endogeneity in input choice arises when producers adjust the amount of material inputs (fuel
and labor in our application) by their eﬃciency diﬀerences in ωs
it. For example, those plants that
perceive higher productivity might have used more fuels. The ordinary least squared (OLS) method,
which fails to account for such correlation, would generate biased estimates. A common response to
the endogeneity problem is to treat unobserved productivity diﬀerences between plants as constant
over the study period, using ﬁxed eﬀects to control for the diﬀerences. This within estimator
uses deviation from plant-speciﬁc means in the OLS estimation. While it deals with permanent
diﬀerences in unobservables, the ﬁxed eﬀect approach is known to exacerbate other misspeciﬁcation
problems such as errors in variables. Furthermore, this approach cannot control for unobserved
plant productivity that varies over time.
To protect against this possible problem in the ﬁxed eﬀect approach, we employ the method
8recently proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (hereafter L-P, 2003). The method is to create a proxy
for ωs
it by bringing in an input demand equation from outside the production function framework:
we refer to this as the proxy method in this paper. It does not assume that plant productivity
diﬀerence is ﬁxed over time. The original idea of this proxy method, attributed to Olley and
Pakes (1996), uses an investment decision function instead of an input demand equation as a
proxy for productivity. This investment proxy, however, is not valid for 70 percent of our data
i nw h i c hp l a n t sr e p o r t e dn oi n v e s t m e n tm a d e( s e eT a b l e3 ) . T h i sf e a t u r eo fo u rd a t ac a u s e sa
problem in considering a proxy for ωs
it using Olley and Pakes’s (1996) technique. The infrequency of
investment revealed in our data is perhaps because steel-production technology involves substantial
capital adjustment costs.4 Use of material inputs, instead of investment, must satisfy the condition,
because furnace operation always requires pig iron and scrap for production. Indeed Table 3 almost
always records the use of material inputs, for which we use the sum of pig iron and scrap in tons.
Moreover, an eﬃcient furnace wastes less material inputs in the reﬁning process, so the material
input consumption is correlated with productivity. This correlation is concurrent particularly with
OHF and BOF use, because molten pig iron, discharged from blast furnaces, cannot be stocked. We
follow the estimation recipe described in L-P (2003, Appendix C) in performing the proxy method.
Our approach diﬀers from that of the cited method in that we have two capital coeﬃcients (capacity
size and experience), and in that we estimate production function by furnace technology. Since the
use of this method has become widespread in the literature of production function estimation (for
example, Pavcnik, 2002; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2004), we defer further details of our estimation
procedure to the technical appendix.
Endogeneity (or self selection) in technology choice arises when a ﬁrm’s decision as to which
furnace technology to use is not random, but correlates with productivity, ωs
it. The severity of se-
lection bias depends on the magnitude of productivity diﬀerence between plants that do and do not
adopt the new technology. In theory, two hypotheses exist as to the relationship between plant pro-
ductivity and technology adoption. One is that more productive plants are more likely to adopt new
technology. For example, Caselli (1999) argues that skilled biased technology tends to be adopted
by plants with high human capital levels, because skill and technology are complementary under
strong learning-by-doing conditions. Since plants with more skilled workers are more productive,
this hypothesis implies that productive plants are more likely to adopt the BOF.5 The alternative
hypothesis is related to technology leapfrogging. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), for example, ﬁnds
an “overtaking” equilibrium where less-productive plants switch to a better technology more often
4Infrequent investment is also observed in the U.S. manufacturing sector (Doms and Dunne, 1998).
5As we discuss in Section 4 and in the Data appendix, our data set is not suitable for testing a hypothesis
concerning wage premium and human capital. The purpose of our discussion here is to illustrate the importance of
controlling for self selection in the choice of technology.
9than productive ones. In their model, productive plants are experienced with old and familiar tech-
nology, while less-productive plants are less attached to the technology. This extensive experience
prevents productive plants from adopting a new technology, while less productive ones are willing
to try it. This hypothesis suggests that less-productive plants are likely to adopt the BOF. The
direction and severity of the selection bias is an empirical question. Thus our speciﬁcation corrects
for this selectivity of furnace technology using sample selection technique.
4 Estimation Results
This section applies the estimation method described in the previous section to the data set.
The production function (1) is speciﬁed by furnace vintage at the plant level. We pool the data
pertaining to all three furnace types and estimate a system for the furnace production functions,
allowing for input coeﬃcients to diﬀer in terms of vintage. The next section uses the estimates
obtained here to construct measures of furnace- and plant-level productivity, and analyzes changes
in the productivity distribution arising from the adoption of BOF technology. Summary statistics
pertaining to variables used for the estimation appear in Table 4, and data sources are available in
the Appendix. Data concerning labor input is worth mentioning. Labor input is the total number
of man hours, constructed from the number of plant-level workers multiplied by the actual average
hours worked by workers at the ﬁrm level. The labor data are not available by furnace vintage. The
variable thus mixes the employment of non-production, skilled, and unskilled production workers.6
Table 4 presents ﬁve estimation results, based on the OLS (column A), plant ﬁxed eﬀect (column
B; hereafter FE), and proxy (columns C, D, and E) methods. The base model (1) assumes plant-
speciﬁc learning in the experience variable, and the speciﬁcation (D) tests this assumption against
the hypothesis of learning spillover between plants under the same ownership. Speciﬁcations (B),
(C), and (D) concern endogeneity in input choice, and speciﬁcation (E) adds the concern of self-
selection bias in technology choice. All speciﬁcations in Table 4 use technology and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. We cannot separately identify ωs
it and εs
it in the OLS and FE methods, but we can in the
proxy method. The upper part of the table reports estimates of the regression coeﬃcients. Our
inference is based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The ﬁve results indicate that the
models ﬁt the data well. The measure of adjusted R2 is quite high, and the J-statistics for the proxy
method support the validity of the instruments, conditional on there being a set of valid instruments
that just identify the model. We also test the hypothesis that the production coeﬃcients are the
same across the three vintages. The results of the Chi-square test presented in the table would
6The results reported in this section are robust to the exclusion of the labor variable. The results are available
upon request. Wage data (not used in this paper, available from Japan Iron and Steel Federation, 1955-1970, b) are
available only at the industry level, and mix skilled and unskilled workers.
10reject the hypothesis of homogenous technology among the three furnaces for most speciﬁcations,
and thus justify our speciﬁcations that allow for coeﬃcients to diﬀer by furnace vintage.
Most of the estimates in (A) are precisely estimated; however, we are concerned that endogeneity
in input choice may lead to a positive correlation between the intermediate inputs (labor, electricity,
and oil) and the current unobserved productivity. The resulting upward bias in the input coeﬃcients
could be severe, as input consumption is easily adjusted to productivity. Furthermore, if inputs
and other state variables, capacity size and vintage-speciﬁc experience, are positively correlated,
the coeﬃcients of the two state variables are shown to be underestimated in the OLS estimation.
The FE estimator accounts for the bias as long as furnace and plant unobserved productivity is
constant over time. It is, however, hard to see from (B) that the bias in the input coeﬃcients is
corrected (or that the bias might not have mattered at all in A). Only the electricity and capital
coeﬃcients of EF move in the expected direction from (B) to (A).
To account for time-varying productivity, we have implemented the proxy method of L-P (2003).
The estimation method is detailed in the technical appendix. The estimates of the coeﬃcients
reported in (C) signiﬁcantly diﬀer from either the OLS or FE results. The input coeﬃcients (labor,
electricity, and oil) are now much lower than those in (A) and (B), indicating successful elimination
of endogeneity. In fact, they are all economically and statistically not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients
of capacity size and experience are precisely estimated, and corrected to the direction predicted
b yt h et h e o r y :s i n c et h el a r g e rf u r n a c ec o n s u m e dm o r ef u e l ,t h ee n d o g e n e i t yo ft h ef u e lv a r i a b l e s
attenuates the contributions of capacity and experience to productivity. The proxy method yields
estimates of capacity size (experience) that are on average 10.0 (10.7) percent higher than those
from obtained using the OLS method, and 18.0 (20.6) higher than those obtained from the FE
method.
The coeﬃcients of vintage-speciﬁc capacity variables are all less than one, and this may indicate
the existence of decreasing returns to scale. This point, however, could be misleading, because we
assume the constant returns to scale across multiple furnaces of the same technology at the plant
level; we do not take into account the fact that capacity size increases only with the installation
of new furnaces. Table 2 indeed indicates that most plants owned multiple furnaces. We have
incorporated the number of furnaces in the estimation, and will discuss the implications for returns
to scale in this section. The learning parameter in (C) indicates that the learning rate for the
OHF was the highest at 37.4 percent, followed by 25.7 percent for the EF and 15.8 for the BOF.
The learning rate is the magnitude of the output increase with a doubling of experience, and is
calculated as 2βz −1. Ghemawat (1985) reviewed the learning-by-doing literature, and found that
the learning rates for the vast majority of products fell in the 11-21 percent range. Thus the BOF
and EF attained slightly higher than average learning rates under (C).
11The ﬁrst three results are based on the assumption that vintage-speciﬁc experience is shared
only within a plant. It is possible that the experience may spill over, not only within a plant,
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where we add to (1) the intra-ﬁrm spillover variables,
￿
j∈Φf,j ￿=i Zs
j,t (for j ∈ Φf,w h e r eΦf is
a set of plants owned by ﬁrm f), representing the cumulative outputs by technology type of the
o t h e rp l a n t s( j  = i)o w n e db yt h es a m eﬁ r mf. Note that all variables in (1) are in logarithmic
form. If the learning spillover has an important impact on productivity, we should observe it in
the coeﬃcients of the new variables. We estimate this model using the proxy method, and the
results are presented under (D) in Table 4. The estimates of βs
z_others are neither statistically nor
economically signiﬁcant for all values of s, and the other coeﬃcients barely change from those in (C).
The FE estimates also generate insigniﬁcant spillover coeﬃcients (not reported in the table). We
conjecture that many plant-speciﬁc conditions, such as furnace age and usage intensity, mattered in
the eﬃcient operation of furnace, and that they hindered other plants from sharing the experience.7
The ﬁnal estimation result, (E) in Table 4, corrects for selectivity in technology choice. The
choice of furnace technology could be endogenous if a persistent relationship exists between plant
productivity and choice of technology. This concern would make both capacity and experience
correlate with the error in the equation. We have modiﬁed the Heckit correction procedure for the
sample selection. The modiﬁcation, described in the technical appendix, is needed because we have
four states for the furnace technology choice: BOF, OHF, EF, and exit. We assume ordered probit
in the selection stage, and add a new correction term for each technology.8
The estimates of the newly included regressors are not signiﬁcant, indicating that the selection
problem is not severe. Indeed, the magnitude of diﬀerences in the estimated elasticities of capacity
size and experience between the results in (C) and (E) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We
thus conclude that the selection problem is less severe, probably because exit from OHF or entry
into EF or BOF are often successes for plants, rather than failures.9 We also check the selectivity
7Industry-level learning by doing, if exists, would be already controlled for by the year ﬁxed eﬀect, λt.
8The validity of the selection model relies on the joint normal distribution. To check the robustness of result
(E) to this distributional assumption, we re-estimated the production function, replacing the ordered probit with a
multinomial logit model as a selection rule. The advantage of the multinomial logit model is that the distribution
does not impose the ordering of the technology states. Since we were unaware of the closed solution for the modiﬁed
Heckit procedure for the multinomial logit, we approximated the three Heckit terms using a third-order polynomial
with a full set of interactions of the estimated logit-choice probabilities. We found that the estimated production
function parameters are similar to those obtained under (E). The results are available on request.
9The selection-bias correction was also only minimally important in Griliches and Mairesse (1998).
12bias using the FE approach, and again conclude that the problem appears to be minor for our data
(The results are available from the authors on request).10
The speciﬁcations in Table 4 do not explicitly consider discontinuity in the capacity size and
experience variables, and assume constant returns to scale across multiple furnaces of the same
technology owned by plant. More than 80 percent of the plants possessed multiple furnaces of the
same vintage, and capacity size in particular changes only with the number of furnaces operated
by a plant. To test whether shifting from n-t on + 1 furnace operations (where n is an integer
greater than zero) changes the capital and experience elasticities of productivity, we have estimated
diﬀerent coeﬃcients of capital and experience by number of furnace. Due to the small sample size,
we shall employ only three plant operation cases: zero-furnace operations, one- or two-furnace
operations, and operations with two or more furnaces. Two estimation results are reported in
Table 5. Both speciﬁcations use the proxy method, and column (G) adds the selectivity control of
technology by the same method as was used in (E). We tried to augment control for the number of
furnaces by using the sample selection technique, but did not succeed mainly because the number
of observations in each state became too small. We thus controlled only for technology choice in
(G). As with the results presented in Table 4, the selectivity bias appears to be minor. Table 5
ﬁnds decreasing returns to scale for physical capital, and increasing returns to scale for experience.
The results make sense in that the experience embodied in furnace operators is easily applicable
to all furnaces of the same technology, while it is diﬃcult to obtain economies of scale in physical
capacity across diﬀerent types of furnaces. However, the standard errors reported at the bottom
of Table 5 indicate that neither of the returns-to-scale estimates are statistically signiﬁcant. The
subsequent sections thus use the estimation results appearing in Table 4 as base estimates.11
To obtain a sense of how the model ﬁts the data, we compare the actual and predicted industry
outputs and furnace-type production shares over the study period. The left-hand side of Table
6 presents predictions based on the (C) estimates, while the right-hand side presents the actual
data.12 The diﬀerence between the actual and predicted values indicate the presence of εs
it.A sw e
discuss in the technical appendix, we use the input data from 1956 to control for endogeneity of
inputs. Thus our estimates in the table and in subsequent sections start in 1957. To save space,
we have listed only the production shares of the largest and the smallest furnaces by vintage at
the end of the sample period. Table 6 shows that the model explains the data well, suggesting
10Note that the estimates of β
s
x in (C) and (D) are the same. This is because the spillover coeﬃcient is calculated
after the estimates of β
s
x are obtained. See appendix A1 for details of the estimation procedure.
11The idea of incorporating the number of furnaces in the production function is similar to that of Bertin, Bresnahan,
and Raﬀ (1996) in its estimation of labor productivity. Our paper diﬀers from the above work in that we are interested
in the adoption of new technology in the estimation of TFP and vintage-speciﬁc learning by doing.
12Use of the results (E) or (F) generates similar results.
13that the productivity unobserved to the producers was small. Industry outputs are predicted fairly
accurately, and there is no noticeable bias in the production shares of the dominant technologies,
OHF and BOF.
5 Productivity and New Technology
This section, comprising two subsections, analyzes the TFP of the post-war Japanese steel industry
using the estimation results presented in the previous section. Section 5.1 analyzes implications for
aggregate industry-level productivity. A productivity slowdown was observed in the 1960s, when
plants adopted BOF reﬁning technology. This suggests that factor accumulation was the leading
contributor to the growth of the Japanese steel industry. To look for the source of the productivity
slowdown, in Section 5.2 we decompose the industry productivity down to the furnace and plant
level, ﬁnding that the loss of OHF experience accounted for the productivity slowdown observed
at the industry level. This section also analyzes hypothetical steel output had plants not adopted
the BOF. We ﬁnd that the new technology indeed contributed to expanded steel production: had
plants stuck with the old technology, output would have increased only 2.3 percent annually, far
below the actual 15.8 percent output growth. This result was explained by our ﬁndings that BOF
produced more steel than did OHF using the same amount of inputs, and that the capital-size
eﬃciency of BOF is far larger than the loss of experience upon BOF adoption.
5.1 Industry-level Productivity
We ﬁrst present aggregated industry productivity for the 1957-1968 period.13 Our productivity
measure comprises the contributions of learning by doing (captured by zs
itβs
z)a n do fd i s e m b o d i e d
technical progress. This latter is represented by the sum of the estimates of τs, λt and ωs
it for (B)
and the proxy method, where ωs
it is the plant ﬁxed eﬀect for (B). Note that for the OLS estimate
we cannot distinguish between ωs
it and εs






estimated productivity for the OLS.14
Table 7 presents annual changes in aggregated industry productivity growth. Productivity is
calculated annually as the share-weighted average of furnace and plant productivity. The table
shows two blocks of TFP estimates. We obtain the ﬁrst block by ignoring the diﬀerence in furnace
vintage (i.e., we estimate (1) without the subscript s). These TFP estimates are based on the
13As discussed in the previous section and in the technical appendix, our estimates start in 1957, because the 1956
data are used as instruments in the estimation. See the technical appendix for details.
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k also generates a similar TFP result. This ﬁnding is not surprising, as Table
6s h o w sag o o dm o d e lﬁ tt ot h ed a t a .
14conventional assumption of homogenous capital. Although the Chi-squared tests presented in Table
4 rejected the homogeneity assumption, the TFP estimates provide a useful reference for our later
discussion. The second block of TFP estimates recognizes the diﬀerence in capital vintage, and is
constructed from estimates (A), (B), and (C) presented in Table 4. Each block presents three TFP
estimates, computed by either the OLS, FE, or proxy methods described in Section 3.
Table 7 shows that conventional estimates produce TFP values about twice as large as those
produced by vintage-capital estimates. Conventional TFP annual growth rates range from 13.5 to
15.2 percent, close to the actual output growth of 17.0 percent. The output growth appears slow
in some periods, three of which (1957-1958, 1961-1962, and 1967-1968) mark known recessions in
Japan. When accounting for vintage in steel technology, we ﬁnd that estimated TFP growth is
substantially reduced to the range from -1.12 to 7.27 percent, indicating a productivity slowdown,
especially in the 1961—1963 period. Interestingly, the slowdown period roughly coincides with the
time when the plants represented in the data updated their technology to the BOF, as shown in
the second column in the table. The results in Table 7 suggest that factor accumulation was the
leading factor in the growth of the Japanese steel industry.
To see productive eﬃciency by furnace type, we present TFP values and input contributions in
Table 8. The TFP values are broken down into two productivity factors: one is learning by doing,
and the other is disembodied technical progress. We realize that it is diﬃcult to compare input
contributions across furnace types because the amounts of inputs used vary by furnace type. We
thus set the inputs of the diﬀerent furnace types to be the same as the OHF inputs for each year





k. Each productivity component (expressed logarithmically) is calculated
annually as the share-weighted average of the plant productivity measure. The table reveals that
the estimated contribution of disembodied technical progress is highest for the BOF: the estimated
contribution of learning by doing is, however, highest for the OHF — the oldest technology. We
also ﬁnd that the inputs contribution is highest for the BOF, indicating that it is the most eﬃcient
steel reﬁning technology in terms of input use, followed by the OHF, and the EF. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the received wisdom described in Section 2.15 Since the contribution of learning by
doing to the TFP of BOF grows slowly, due to the small estimated coeﬃcient of learning by doing
reported in Table 4, we conjecture that plants must have suﬀered an initial productivity decline
15The measure of disembodied technical progress in Table 7 moves in accordance with technology progress as
reported in the trade press. The utilization rate of one of the most eﬃcient OHF process, which used oxygen, started
to decline in 1961, when plants switched to the BOF. The contribution of disembodied technical progress in the BOF
and EF meanwhile generally increased. For the BOF, two important improvements (the multi-hole lance and the
OG system) were implemented in the period. Use of a large-capacity transformer is known to have improved EF
production.
15when shifting production to the BOF. The aggregated productivity displayed in Tables 7 and 8,
however, does not tell us the exact source of the productivity slowdown observed in Table 7. The
next subsection delves further into plant-level productivity in pursuit of the source of the slowdown.
5.2 Source and Implications of Productivity Slowdown
Table 9 shows the annual output shares and the share-weighted plant-level productivity. Sixty-six
plants are represented in the data, and grouped by operating furnace type. The table divides the
plants into two groups: those that kept using the old OHF technology, and those that adopted
the new technology at some point in the study period. The ﬁrst group comprises ﬁve subgroups
depending on the types of furnaces owned, while the second group comprises two such subgroups.
Plants that used OHF technology and added EF during the study period are placed in category
(G9), while those that added EF prior to the study period are placed in category (B9) in Table 9.
The table shows that the average productivity of adopting plants (column H9) is higher than
that of non-adopting plants (column E9). This is indicated by fact that the ratio of the productivity
indices, shown in column (I9), is greater than one. This ratio shrinks from greater than 2 to 1.5
over the decade, because of the learning-by-doing eﬀect: a BOF-adopting plant loses OHF-speciﬁc
experience upon new technology adoption, while a non-adopting plant continues to accumulate
experience. More than 70 percent of the OHF plants had newly added BOF in the study period
(under F9), attaining the highest average productivity. Five new plants had installed BOF only
(D9), but they do not account for the productivity slowdown displayed in Table 7. The plants that
had newly installed EF (shown in G9) had lower productivity than those with OHF throughout
the period (A9). It is likely that the plants in (G9) are those that were not eﬃcient enough to
maintain a large facility, and thus downsized by installing EF, as discussed in Section 2.
Considering their large production share, the main culprits in the TFP slowdown observed
in Table 7 are the plants in category (F9). We will take a closer look at those thirteen plants
that adopted BOF, and analyze the impact of the new technology adoption on their plant-level
productivity. Figure 2 shows the changes in average productivity among the thirteen plants by
year elapsed from BOF adoption. The horizontal axis indicates the number of years passed after
BOF adoption, and thus the negative numbers indicate the number of years during which plants
used the OHF before adopting the BOF. We show four diﬀerent estimates of the productivity,
constructed using the (A), (B), (C), and (E) estimates from Table 4. To facilitate comparison
among the four productivity estimates, we normalize them (logarithmically) to be 100 at time 0,
when the BOF was adopted. Figure 2 indicates that the adopting plants’ productivity rapidly rises
with the OHF, and then declines, followed by the adoption of BOF. This indicates that managers of
the adopting plants may have timed the adoption, based on the TFP of their old vintage technology:
16once they observed that the TFP of the OHF had begun to decline, the managers installed the new
BOF technology. At the point of BOF adoption, productivity dropped by between 13.9 and 58.1
percent, based on the FE and the proxy estimates, respectively.16
This productivity drop is primarily due to the loss of OHF-speciﬁc experience. Our growth ac-
counting, based on the proxy estimates, indicates that the TFP decline of -0.943 can be decomposed
into two components: the change in learning by doing (-2.367), and the change in disembodied tech-
nical progress (1.423). Plant productivity gradually rose after BOF adoption, but it might have
taken time before it overtook the productivity level previously achieved by the OHF: the FE es-
timates indicate that it would have taken three years.17 This estimated number of years for the
productivity catchup is small in comparison with calibration results presented in the literature.
Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001), for example, ﬁnds that the advent of information technology sets
labor productivity back, and that it takes about thirty years to return to its pre-IT level. One might
expect that a general purpose technology would take longer to diﬀuse than a speciﬁc technology
such as the one dealt with in this paper.
One might infer from the large loss of experience acquired with the OHF that the BOF diﬀusion
rate must have been slower. In deciding when to adopt the new technology, a plant must have
compared the future beneﬁt of adopting the BOF with the cost of losing the value of the old
experience upon the adoption. Experience with the old and familiar technology must have hindered
a plant from updating its furnaces to the BOF type, suggesting a slower BOF diﬀusion. On the
contrary, Table 1 indicates that BOF diﬀused rapidly, as discussed in Section 2.
Close study of trade journals provides an explanation that allows us to reconcile the seemingly
contradicting observations of both rapid diﬀusion and large estimated experience loss. Section 2
mentioned that the MITI had succeeded in bargaining for a low license fee for the BOF use. The
license cost per ton of steel production came to 0.36 cents for all Japanese companies, while ﬁrms
in North America, which negotiated individually with other license holders, paid in the range of
15 to 25 cents. Previous literature has argued that this diﬀerence in license fees explains the slow
BOF diﬀusion in the U.S. and the rapid diﬀusion in Japan (for example, Lynn, 1982).
16The TFP’s obtained from the proxy method are ﬁve percent larger than those from the OLS and EF estimates.
This TFP diﬀerence is primarily due to the insigniﬁcant estimate of the electricity consumption for OHF. Use of the
95-percent lower bound of this estimate produces the TFP, very close to the ones from the OLS and FE estimates.
Considering that the electricity coeﬃcient is precisely estimated in the OLS and FE, we feel rather comfortable with
the ﬁnding of the 13.9-percent productivity fall.
17Figure 2 shows that all four types of TFP estimate behave in similar fashion after technology adoption, even
though the (C) and (E) estimates are not similar to either the (A) or (B) estimates. We ﬁnd that the increase in
TFP due to the smaller BOF-electricity coeﬃcient in (C) and (E) is oﬀset by the decrease in TFP due to the larger
BOF-capital-size coeﬃcient, resulting in the TFP values in (C) and (E) being similar in level to those in (A) and (B).
17MITI eﬀorts to keep the royalty low was unlikely to have enhanced the welfare of the steel
industry: we observed no evidence of spillover or externalities of the BOF adoption. However, it is
evident that this intervention helped reduce the cost of BOF adoption, and encouraged Japanese
steel makers to access a technology more productive than the OHF. Ultimately this government
assistance may have helped the steel industry to achieve the remarkable growth of the 1950s and
1960s (in Figure 1). To analyze the extent to which BOF diﬀusion accounted for steel industry
growth, we will perform the following simulation exercise. We ask how much steel would have
been produced if BOF adopting plants had not installed the technology, but instead retained their
old and familiar technology. Our simulation scenario assumes that those plants that adopted the
BOF instead expanded their OHF capacity. The size and the timing of the capacity expansion are
assumed to be the same as those of the actual BOF adoption. As well, the amounts of intermediate
inputs (labor, electricity, and oil) used are assumed to be the same as were actually used in BOF
adoption, and the estimate of the average disembodied productivity is used for the calculating the
hypothetical OHF output.
To evaluate the validity of our simulation assumptions, one has to model the plant’s behavior in
terms of the choice of the amount of inputs and the timing and size of capacity expansion. Building
such a model is, however, beyond the scope of this paper, so we base our simulation exercise on the
exogenous assumptions presented here. The direction of the bias resulting from these exogenous
assumptions could be downward: since the future of the technology is less uncertain with the OHF
than with the BOF, plants would have expanded their old-technology capacity prior to the BOF
adoption, and by a larger amount. This would make the hypothetical OHF output larger than the
output achieved under the exogenous assumptions for any given year. Since the magnitude of the
bias is diﬃcult to assess using our framework, we should regard the following simulation results
with caution. The results presented in Figure 3 indicate that the adoption of the new technology
boosted steel production. They further indicate that had the BOF adoption not taken place, little
output would have been achieved with the OHF: annual growth of merely 2.3 percent, far below the
actual 15.2 percent growth achieved in the study period (1957 — 1968). This is due to our previous
ﬁnding that the BOF produces more steel than does the OHF given the same amount of inputs
(capital size in particular), and that the capital eﬃciency of the BOF is far greater than the loss
of experience upon the adoption of BOF.
Although we cannot assess such a hypothetical question as what would have happened to steel
output had the MITI not negotiated a lower license fee on behalf of all steel makers, it appears
that MITI intervention did help lower a barrier to Japanese ﬁrms accessing the new technology.
As a consequence, steel production quadrupled over the decade to raise Japan to the status of the
world’s largest steel exporter toward the end of our sample period.
186C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigated the eﬀects on productivity of new technology adoption, using plant-level
data pertaining to the Japanese steel industry. In the 1950s and 1960s, the steel industry ex-
perienced a rapid diﬀusion of BOF technology, which was praised as “unquestionably one of the
greatest technological breakthroughs in the steel industry during the twentieth century” (Hogan,
1971: 1543). It is known that furnace operation required vintage-speciﬁc learning by doing. Es-
timation of the production function indeed found a signiﬁcant learning eﬀect, comparable to the
level found in other studies of learning by doing. The large learning eﬀect associated with the old
technology (i.e., OHF) implies that productivity falls after the adoption of the new technology (i.e.,
BOF). We indeed identiﬁed a substantial productivity drop, estimated at over 14 percent, upon
the BOF adoption. We also found that it would have taken more than three years to overtake
the productivity level previously achieved with the OHF technology. Although striking as they
seem, our results do not lie outside the range of predictions based on calibration of the models
of embodied vintage-speciﬁc technological changes (surveyed in Greenwood and Jovanovic, 2001).
The above results are robust to econometrics problems, including endogeneity of input choice and
self-selection of technology choice, in the production function estimation.
Growth accounting, based on the estimated production function, indicates that TFP played a
minor role. The small TFP estimate is mostly attributable to the loss of vintage-speciﬁc experience
caused by adoption of the BOF by many plants. Traditional treatment of capital as homogenous
would miss this productivity slowdown, as has already been pointed out by Gort and Wall (1998).
Indeed, TFP growth more than doubles if we apply the faulty assumption of homogenous vintage
capitals (Section 4 discussed the test statistics presented in Table 4 reject this assumption of homo-
geneousness). We ﬁnd, in passing, that productive plants are likely to adopt the new technology,
and that the adoption is timed to occur right after peak TFP is achieved with the old technology.
Although TFP growth was small, adoption of the BOF was of considerable help to steel pro-
duction in the study period. This is because the BOF was a far more eﬃcient technology than was
the OHF, in that it produced more steel using the same amounts of inputs. If BOF adoption had
not taken place, steel output would have grown at a mere 2 percent annually, in a stark contrast
to the actual growth rate of 15 percent.
Despite the large loss of OHF-speciﬁc experience, the steel industry kept up the rapid diﬀusion
of BOF technology. We argued that this high diﬀusion rate had been fueled by MITI eﬀorts to
lower the new technology license fee for Japanese use. Government negotiation with the patent
holder lowered the barrier to Japanese steel makers accessing BOF technology. This government
assistance encouraged BOF adoption, and as a result, steel production quadrupled during our study
period. Based on the ﬁnding that the steel industry had a signiﬁcant impact on GDP growth in
19Japan in the 1960s (Nakamura, 1978: 235)18, we could even associate the MITI intervention with
the subsequent period of economic growth in Japan. This empirical study thus indirectly supports
the theoretical implications of Parente and Prescott (2001), which claims that removal of barriers
to the technology frontier enhance economic growth.
A Estimation Details on Proxy Method
This appendix describes the proxy method employed to estimate (1). The appendix closely follows
the steps in the estimation recipe described in Levinsohn and Petrin (L-P, 2003). Our approach
diﬀers from that of the method in that we have two state variables (capacity size and experience),
and in that we estimate a production function for each technology. Section A.1 discusses a method
that controls for endogeneity in input choice, and Section A.2 adds a correction method for sample
selection.
A.1 Endogeneity Issue
Major inputs for steel production are pig iron and scrap. We assume that the sum of these inputs,
ms
t, is entirely determined by the unobserved productivity, capacity, and experience of technology
s at time t:
ms




To account for the considerable technological diﬀerences between furnace types, we deﬁne the
input demand by s. More of the steel inputs are demanded with an increase in productivity shock
(ωs
it), capacity size (ks
it), or experience level (zs
it).19 The monotonicity condition allows us to invert
function (2) to obtain ωs
it = hs (ms
it,ks
it,zs
it). We can take the inverse of (2) only for the positive
values of inputs. The invertibility condition holds for the intermediate inputs, but does not hold
for the use of investment in our data, since many plants reported zero investment, as presented
in Table 3. Note that the function h(·) does not contain an error. To minimize the bias from
misspeciﬁcation, we allow for the proxy function to be fully ﬂexible in the following estimation.









18Nakamura (1978) ﬁnds that a one-percent increase in the physical capital of the steel industry would have
induced 0.32 percent of Japanese GDP growth. The magnitude of this impact is the second largest among two-digit
SIC industries, followed by construction (0.33).
19We found empirical support for the monotonicity property by using a series expansion of the function m
s
it in (3),
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is partially linear with an unknown function, φs. The coeﬃcients, βs
k and βs
z,c a n n o tb ed i r e c t l y
recovered from (3), because the corresponding variables occur twice in φs.W ee s t i m a t eβs
x in (3),




it. We have severe collinearity between variables with the fourth- and the higher-order
polynomials, but obtained similar results. This method corrects for the endogeneity in βs
x, because
the omitted variable, ωs
it, is fully recovered by the proxy function. Using the estimates of βs
x for all









z +τs +λt +ωs
it +εs
it, (4)
where ￿ βx is the estimate of βx obtained from the previous paragraph. If ωs
it is not serially correlated,
we can estimate (4) with the two-stage least squared method. We use as the instruments one-period
lagged capital (ks
it−1), experience (zs
it−1), material, fuel, and labor inputs (ms
it−1 andxs
it−1), and year
and technology dummies. The current productivity shock should not aﬀect the variables determined
in the past under the assumption of uncorrelated productivity. Two statistical tests ﬁnd evidence
against this assumption of no serial correlation. The standard J test (i.e., the test of overidentifying
restrictions) would reject the orthogonality condition between some of the instruments and the
productivity shock, and the Durbin-Watson test of the existence of serial correlation would ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant AR(1) coeﬃcient of 0.73 with a standard error of 0.03. In view of the persistent
productivity shock, we follow the procedure suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and L-P (2003):
We assume that ωs
it follows a random walk, and that the predetermined variables, ks
it and zs
it,a r e



























where the last term in the right-hand side of (5) is the conditional expectation of ωs
it given ωs
it−1.























z − τs − λt
￿
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With the estimate of φs, we use a third-order polynomial to estimate g(·) for candidate values
for βs ≡ (βs
k,βs
z,τs,λ t). We use Cobb-Douglas estimates of βs for the initial values, and update
them using the following generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation routine. The moment
condition is such that a set of exogenous variables, Ξ, is orthogonal to the GMM error, νs
it,d e ﬁ n e d
by the left-hand side of (5). We include nine variables in Ξ for each s: predetermined stock variables




it−1); the material input at t − 1 (ms
it−1); electricity, oil, and
21labor at time t − 1 (xs
it−1); and the constant by s. The input variables at t, ms
it,a n dxs
it,a r e
not exogenous, in that they can quickly adjust to the current productivity shock. The moment
conditions are established for each of the three furnace technologies. We estimate βs (s =O H F ,
BOF, and EF) by minimizing the objective function, (Ξ￿ν)
￿ (Ξ￿ν),w h e r eν is the vector of the GMM
error, whose (i,t) element in the s-th block is vs
it. This completes the proxy estimation method
when we do not account for self selection on technology.
Standard errors of the estimates are calculated with a bootstrap technique. Since we estimate
production function by furnace type, bootstrapping is also performed independently by furnace.
T h en u m b e ro fp l a n t si s2 8( 2 7 6 )w i t hO H F ,18 (104) with BOF, and 50 (468) with EF, with the
number of observations appearing in parenthesis. Note that our data are unbalanced, and that
even for the same furnace technology, furnace life (i.e., the number of years which a furnace was
active) diﬀers by plant. We place equal probability on each of the plant observations in a data pool
stratiﬁed by furnace type. We resample a plant using a replacement from a pool of plants grouped
by furnace type. The resampling process is stopped when the number of observations equals or only
just exceeds that of the original data. We repeat this resampling process 1000 times and construct
a production function estimate distribution, from which we take the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile points
to obtain the 95% conﬁdence interval of the parameter.
A.2 Selection Issue regarding Technology
In the empirical implementation, the selectivity problem regarding technology choice is made ap-








z +τs +λt +E (ωs
it|dit),
where the selection indicator, dit, takes either BOF, OHF, EF, or exit for ﬁrm i at time t.I f
the selection indicator correlates with plant productivity, then the last term of the above equation
is not equal to the unconditional expectation, E (ωs
it). We assume that the latent variable that
determines the type of technology is joint normally distributed with the production function errors.
Under the normality assumption, we ﬁrst run the following selection model on dit:
Pr(dit = BOF)=1 −F (c3 − itγ), (6)
Pr(dit = OHF)=F (c3 −  itγ)− F (c2 −  itγ),
Pr(dit = EF)=F (c2 −  itγ)− F (c1 −  itγ),
Pr(dit = exit)=F (c1 −  itγ),
22where F is the cumulative normal distribution. This ordered probit models the following four cases:
plant i chooses BOF at time t,i ft h el a t e n tv a r i a b l e , itγ + εs
it, crosses beyond c3; OHF if it lies
between c2 and c3; EF if it is between c1 and c2; and exits otherwise. We estimate γ and the three
threshold values in the ﬁrst-stage regression.
Decisions about technology adoption are inherently dynamic.20 One should thus consider model
(6) as a reduced form of such a dynamic decision-making process. We assume that each plant bases
its adoption decision on its own productivity, market size, and other important plant characteristics.
Thus, for key regressor  it, we include the following nine variables, two plant variables, and year
dummies by vintage: capacity sizes of the three vintages from the previous period (i.e., ks
it−1
for all s); vintage-speciﬁc experience from the previous period (i.e., zs
it−1 for all s); strength of







for all s), two plant variables (plant age; and blast furnace dummy, which takes 1
if the plant has a blast-furnace facility, and 0 otherwise), and year dummies.21
We include capacity size and experience of all three vintages to observe how the presence of other
vintage capital and experience would have inﬂuenced the selection of a particular technology. The
demand measure is also included by vintage. If a plant observed that its sale (thus production) of
steel from vintage s declines, it would have stopped the operation of s furnace. Section 2 discussed
that fact that plants with blast furnaces were more likely to adopt either BOF or OHF, and that
such a likelihood would be captured by the blast-furnace dummy. Diﬀerent year dummies are
included by furnace type. The year dummies are to control for aggregate trends in the variables.
They also control for the dynamics of the installation cost of each reﬁning technology. Section 2
discussed that fact that the license fee for BOF use was uniform among all ﬁrms in a given year.
The eﬀect of the BOF license fee can thus be removed by the BOF year dummies. OHF and
EF use did not, however, require license payment. Under the assumption of perfect competition
in the reﬁning technology market for OHF and EF, the dynamics of the installation cost of each
technology can also be controlled for by using the OHF and EF year dummies.
This selection regression provides an estimate of the expected value of the error, E (ωs
it|dit),f o r
each s,s a y￿ µs
it. Controlling for the sample selection, however, does not remove the endogeneity
concern discussed in the Section 3. Under the assumption of constant plant productivity, the
endogeneity is controlled for by the inclusion of the plant-ﬁxed eﬀect. If plant productivity varies
with time, we need to rely on the proxy method described in Section A1, making minor changes to
incorporate the sample selection correction. We assume that the productivity shock, ωs
it,c o m p o s e s
two elements: one is the shock inducing the selection on technology, and the other is the one
20Besley and Case (1994), for example, estimates a Markov Perfect Equilibrium for the adoption of HYV cotton.
21Oster (1982) uses a probit model to examine BOF diﬀusion in the United States. She does not consider the other
furnace technologies, nor the importance of learning by doing in her work.
23generating the endogeneity discussed in Section A1. Let us denote the latter shock ￿ ωs
it.F o l l o w i n g
Section A1, we assume that this shock is a function of ms
it, ks
it,a n dzs
it:t h a ti s ,￿ ωs
























it). The rest of the estimation procedure
is the same as discussed in Section A1, if we replace φs with ￿ φs in (3) and add the new regressor, ￿ µs
it,
with coeﬃcient ρ to be estimated at the ﬁrst stage along with βs
x.U n d e rt h en o r m a l i t y assumption,
the production function parameters in (7) are consistent with the proxy method.
The validity of the selection model relies on the assumptions of (i) the order of d￿
its, and (ii) the
joint normal distribution. To check the robustness of the obtained results to the two assumptions,
we re-estimate the production function, replacing the ordered probit with a multinomial logit model
as a selection rule (see footnote 8 for details). The advantage of the multinomial logit model is
that the distribution does not impose the ordering of dit as an assumption. We also rerun a probit
model with diﬀerent orders of dit from (6). We ﬁnd that obtained results are similar to the baseline
ordered probit results.
BD a t a A p p e n d i x
Our data set comprises annual plant-level furnace data describing 66 plants and 39 Japanese steel
ﬁrms from 1956 to 1968. The output and input (except for labor and physical capital, as we describe
below) data are from the Japan Steel Federation (1955-1970, a). The data cover approximately
90 percent of the total steel production throughout the study period. Of the various types of
crude steel, we focused on ingots for rolled steel. This type of crude steel was widely used for
various industries, ranging from automobile production to construction and shipbuilding. For the
inputs, we collected data concerning the amounts of oil and electricity. The output and input
data identify three furnace types (OHF, BOF, and EF) for each plant. More than 80 percent of
the plants covered in the data operated more than one furnace of a given year. The input and
output data are aggregated over these multiple furnaces of the same vintage within a plant. The
results presented in Table 5 may justify this assumption, in that an explicit consideration of the
existence of multiple furnaces of the same vintage capital does not signiﬁcantly alter the production
function estimates. The cumulative plant output by vintage is calculated starting from 1947. This
assumption is reasonable, as Figure 1 indicates the devastation state of the industry that year, due
to the aftermath of bombardment.
Data concerning labor input are constructed from two data sets: the number of workers at
24the plant level (from Japan Steel Federation, 1955-1970: a), and actual work hours averaged over
workers at the ﬁrm level (from Steel Newspaper, 1955-1970). The data concerning the number
of workers are not disaggregated by furnace, unlike the other input data obtained from the same
source. The labor input used for the estimation is total man hours, constructed from the number
of plant-level workers multiplied by the actual work hours averaged over workers at the ﬁrm level.
The data thus do not distinguish between non-production workers, skilled and unskilled production
workers.
The data concerning furnace capacity by plant came from companies’ semiannual ﬁnancial
reports, which identify all furnace capacities for the 66 plants covered in our data. The data
recorded capacity as of the end of year t, and investment was made only when a new furnace
was built. The capacity of furnace js whose technology is s,o fp l a n ti at t changes as follows:
k
js
it = (1 −δ)k
js
it−1,w h e r eδ is the depreciation rate. We set δ t o5p e r c e n t ,t ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
that furnace eﬃciency may have been declining over time. The assumption of zero depreciation rate
generates similar results. To be consistent with the inputs data described above, we aggregated k
js
it
over s to obtain the capital variable of furnace s of plant i at year t.
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27TABLE 1
Number of Plants and Share of Output by Furnace
Classified by Firm Size, 1956 - 1968
TOP 6 FIRMS THE OTHER FIRMS INDUSTRY
TOTAL
OHF BOF EF Total OHF BOF EF Total 
total output plant total output plant total output plant plant total output plant total output plant total output plant plant firms output
(% tons) (no) (% tons) (no) (% tons) (no) (no) (% tons) (no) (% tons) (no) (% tons) (no) (no) (no) (M tons)
1956 72.2 15 4.5 3 1.5 9 18 15.0 11 0 0 6.8 35 39 36 9.98
1957 71.4 15 4.1 2 1.7 8 17 15.7 12 0 0 7.1 35 39 36 11.05
1958 69.8 15 7.8 2 1.5 8 17 14.0 11 0 0 6.9 33 37 36 10.63
1959 67.3 15 8.3 2 1.5 8 17 14.6 12 0 0 8.3 34 37 35 14.55
1960 61.9 15 13.5 4 1.8 9 19 13.6 13 0.2 1 8.9 36 40 37 19.17
1961 54.9 14 20.9 7 2.4 10 19 11.9 13 1.1 1 8.8 35 39 36 24.37
1962 43.7 14 34.4 8 1.9 11 19 9.9 13 1.4 1 8.7 38 42 36 23.57
1963 32.8 12 44.1 10 2.1 10 18 10.0 13 1.2 1 9.8 39 43 36 26.56
1964 29.3 12 49.8 10 2.0 12 18 8.3 13 1.7 3 8.8 38 42 35 34.11
1965 20.0 14 58.7 13 2.1 12 21 5.5 12 5.1 3 8.6 36 41 34 35.39
1966 13.4 11 65.1 14 1.7 11 21 4.5 10 7.1 4 8.1 34 38 34 41.32
1967 10.9 11 72.7 16 1.7 12 23 3.3 8 3.9 3 7.4 32 37 33 54.39
1968 4.5 9 79.6 17 1.7 12 24 3.0 7 3.8 2 7.5 32 37 33 58.89
NOTE:
The data cover 90% of the market at any given year. "TOP 6 FIRMS" are chosen in terms of market share of crude steel production. They are Yawata, Fuji, Nihon Kokan, Kawasaki, Sumitomo, and Kobe.TABLE 2
Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables by Furnace Types
Annual Plant Level Data from the Japanese Steel Industry, 1956 - 1968
Unit Mean Std. Error Min Max
Open Hearth Furnace  (OHF)
Output Production 1000 tons 228.14 0.0036 0.24 3746.19
Material Inputs (pig iron + scrap) 1000 tons 274.22 0.0031 6.24 4293.36
Physical Capacity tons  90.31 3.40 3.75 1206.74
Furnace Age yesrs 19.22 9.61 0 50.50
Electricity 1000 kWh 6.72 0.005 0 113.53
Oil M liters 15.05 0.006 0 170.68
Cumulative outputs by furnace/plant 1000 tons 1550.38 0.01 0.001 43322
Number of Furnaces per plant - 4.43 4.26 1.00 28.00
Blast Furnace Dummy 0.49 0.50 0 1.00
Plant Age years 33.65 17.27 0 67.00
Number of observations = 304
Basic Oxygen Furnace  (BOF)
Output Production 1000 tons 964.96 0.0032 10.20 7622.23
Material Inputs (pig iron + scrap) 1000 tons 1043.65 0.0032 11.83 8281.63
Physical Capacity tons  149.76 2.07 39.81 550.45
Furnace Age yesrs 2.90 2.22 0 8.67
Electricity 1000 kWh 14.51 0.003 0.24 208.53
Cumulative outputs by furnace/plant 1000 tons 293.97 0.16 0 34712
Number of Furnaces per plant - 2.81 1.43 2.00 8.00
Blast Furnace Dummy 0.98 0.16 0 1.00
Plant Age years 31.76 20.79 0 67.00
Number of observations = 122
Electric Furnace  (EF)
Output Production 1000 tons 36.98 0.0030 0.28 544.79
Material Inputs (pig iron + scrap) 1000 tons 37.69 0.0060 0 582.01
Physical Capacity tons  23.23 2.54 2.34 206.69
Furnace Age yesrs 12.86 7.05 0 27.80
Electricity 1000 kWh 32.60 0.003 0 345.45
Cumulative outputs by furnace/plant 1000 tons 135.87 0.009 0 2233
Number of Furnaces per plant - 3.44 1.71 1.00 9.00
Blast Furnace Dummy 0.12 0.32 0 1.00
Plant Age years 28.53 16.34 0 67.00
Number of observations = 518
Plant-level variable
Total Man hours hours 89376.9 107130 808 639948TABLE 3
Percentage of Non-zero Observations
Investment Material Inputs
∆(Capacity) (pig iron + scrap) Electricity Oil
Open Hearth Furnace 0.23 1.00 0.98 0.98
Basic Oxygen Furnace 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.44
Electric Furnace 0.24 0.99 1.00 0.54TABLE 4
Estimation Results on Production Function (1)
OLS FE Proxy Method Proxy with Proxy with
Knowledge  Selection
Spillover
( A ) ( B ) ( C ) ( D ) ( E )
Est. Std. error Est. Std. error Est. Std. error Est. Std. error Est. Std. error
Labor 0.045 0.031 0.314 
a 0.060 0.020 0.054 0.020 0.054 0.107 0.074
Electricity
OHF 0.054
 b 0.024 0.087 
a 0.021 -0.007 0.016 -0.007 0.015 -0.001 0.015
Electricity
BOF 0.078 0.065 0.082 0.063 0.010 0.022 0.010 0.021 0.011 0.032
Electricity
EF 0.252
 a 0.037 0.143 
a 0.034 -0.008 0.196 -0.008 0.194 -0.017 0.201
Oil
OHF 0.117 
a 0.022 0.086 
a 0.020 0.023 0.075 0.023 0.068 0.022 0.072
Capital size
OHF 0.389 
a 0.035 0.339 
a 0.040 0.403 





a 0.084 0.653 
a 0.094 0.818 





a 0.037 0.526 
a 0.042 0.578 





a 0.038 0.394 
a 0.037 0.458 





a 0.039 0.227 
a 0.034 0.212 





a 0.025 0.217 
a 0.026 0.330 




OHF - - - -0.005 0.010 -
Other_Experience
BOF - - - 0.014 0.008 -
Other_Experience
EF - - - -0.022 0.017 -
Select. Bias Correct.
OHF - - - - 0.084 0.075
Select. Bias Correct.
BOF - - - - 0.072 0.091
Select. Bias Correct.
EF - - - - 0.166 0.133
Chi-squared tests on OHF=BOF=EF
Learning Rate for OHF
Learning Rate for BOF
Learning Rate for EF
Adj R
2 for ( A ) and ( B ) ---
J-Statistics for ( C ) - ( E ) - -
Number of Observation = 836
a Significance at the 99-percent confidence level.
b Significance at the 95-percent confidence level.
Note:
The technology and year dummy variables are included in the estimation, but their estimated coefficients are not reported in the table. 






















1.48 1.60 1.31TABLE 5
Estimation Results on Production Function (1)
with Number of Furnaces
Proxy Method Proxy Method 
with Technology
Selection
( F ) ( G )
Est. Std. error Est. Std. error
Labor 0.020 0.054 0.107 0.075
Electricity
OHF -0.007 0.016 -0.001 0.016
Electricity
BOF 0.010 0.022 0.011 0.031
Electricity
EF -0.008 0.204 -0.017 0.197
Oil
OHF 0.023 0.072 0.022 0.071
Capital size (No. Furnace≤2)
 OHF 0.383 
a 0.145 0.408
a 0.153
Capital size (No. Furnace>2)
 OHF 0.355 
a 0.084 0.387
a 0.080














































Returns to scale in OHF capital -0.03 0.17 -0.02 0.18
Returns to scale in BOF capital -0.19 0.25 -0.11 0.30
Returns to scale in EF capital -0.41 0.23 -0.35 0.24
Returns to scale in OHF experience 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
Returns to scale in BOF experience 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.11
Returns to scale in EF experience 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07
J-Statistics
Number of Observation = 836
a Significance at the 99-percent confidence level.
b Significance at the 95-percent confidence level.
Note:
The technology and year dummy variables are included in the estimation,
 but their estimated coefficients are not reported in the table. 
1.26 1.63TABLE 6
Model Predictions
Industry OHF BOF EF OHF BOF EF Industry OHF BOF EF OHF BOF EF
Output Yawata Yawata Yawata Topy Osaka Tohoku Output Yawata Yawata Yawata Topy Osaka Tohoku
(M tons) (Yawata) (Yawata) (Yawata) (Tokyo) (Nishijima) Specialty Steel (M tons) (Yawata) (Yawata) (Yawata) (Tokyo) (Nishijima) Specialty Steel
1957 10.19 23.11 - 0.50 1.08 - 0.04 11.23 24.60 - 0.40 1.00 - 0.07
1958 10.40 21.58 4.11 0.39 0.95 - 0.05 10.49 22.89 4.03 0.29 0.90 - 0.08
1959 14.91 21.64 5.16 0.37 0.87 - 0.04 14.27 22.59 5.06 0.31 0.84 - 0.07
1960 19.22 17.96 9.30 0.34 0.75 - 0.04 18.73 18.10 8.38 0.34 0.71 - 0.15
1961 23.38 15.77 11.08 0.34 0.70 - 0.04 23.80 15.74 9.85 0.25 0.67 - 0.06
1962 22.24 13.15 13.99 0.29 0.47 - 0.05 23.55 11.59 12.43 0.20 0.42 - 0.06
1963 25.59 10.27 14.80 0.28 0.35 - 0.04 26.10 9.01 13.92 0.21 0.33 - 0.05
1964 32.03 8.85 14.84 0.27 0.38 - 0.04 33.55 7.89 14.61 0.22 0.39 - 0.05
1965 31.41 7.09 14.90 0.26 0.40 0.87 0.03 34.02 6.12 14.60 0.25 0.41 0.83 0.03
1966 40.57 4.97 13.93 0.25 0.35 0.79 0.03 40.18 4.21 13.87 0.21 0.37 0.82 0.04
1967 51.79 3.72 14.61 0.25 0.30 0.70 0.03 52.71 2.97 14.39 0.21 0.31 0.70 0.03
1968 57.71 1.74 13.28 0.23 0.23 0.59 0.03 57.86 1.41 13.17 0.19 0.25 0.62 0.03
Notes:
For each entry of furnace production share, we list a company name in the first row, and a plant name in the second row inside the parenthesis,
Tohoku Specialty Steel owned only one plant. Yawata adopted the BOF in 1958, and Osaka (Nishijima plant) did so in 1965. 
To calculate the predicted values, we use the estimates ( C ) in Table 4.
Estimated Actual
Largest Furnaces Shares (%) Smallest Furnaces Shares (%) Largest Furnaces Shares (%) Smallest Furnaces Shares (%)TABLE 7
Various Measures on TFP Growth (%), 1957-1968
No. BOF Output Growth
Adopting  OLS FE Proxy OLS FE Proxy (From Figure 1)
1957-58 2 0.64 2.25 -3.48 -5.98 -6.52 2.41 -6.55
1958-59 0 18.04 15.17 25.37 19.15 15.69 29.53 35.97
1959-60 0 14.83 14.29 13.05 12.16 10.81 10.07 31.31
1960-61 2 17.59 15.07 16.46 14.06 11.32 -6.06 27.02
1961-62 3 3.86 6.34 -1.48 -22.47 -18.37 -34.93 -1.01
1962-63 1 14.27 12.24 12.90 -6.69 -2.64 -11.04 10.82
1963-64 2 29.69 28.48 22.04 24.14 24.06 5.12 28.51
1964-65 1 9.50 8.93 5.09 -4.92 -0.41 -20.69 1.41
1965-66 2 24.61 22.21 32.94 15.77 19.14 8.97 18.10
1966-67 0 20.23 19.81 17.83 15.00 14.08 5.37 31.20
1967-68 0 13.95 12.43 7.58 9.65 12.78 -1.03 9.77
Average  15.20 14.29 13.48 6.35 7.27 -1.12 16.96
(%)
Note:
The estimated TFP in the table is share-weighted average of the plant level productivity measure, using furnace/plant-level 
output share as weight. Conventional TFP is calculated by estimating (1) without the subscript s  (i.e., ignoring the difference
in furnace vintage). Vintage-Capital TFP is calculated by using the estimates of OLS ( A ), FE ( B ), and proxy ( C ) methods 
presented in Table 4.
Conventional TFP Growth Vintage-Capital TFP GrowthTABLE 8
Sources of Productivity by furnace type
Average annual share-weighted TFP components
OHF BOF EF
Contributions of Contributions of Contributions of
Learning Disembodied Inputs Learning Disembodied Inputs Learning Disembodied Inputs
by Doing Technical  (Use of  by Doing Technical  (Use of  by Doing Technical  (Use of 
Progress OHF inputs) Progress OHF inputs) Progress OHF inputs)
1957 6.85 3.79 2.48 - 6.48 4.56 3.87 4.49 3.15
1958 6.94 3.71 2.47 2.73 6.18 4.55 3.91 4.44 3.14
1959 7.00 3.95 2.53 2.93 6.06 4.66 3.98 4.68 3.22
1960 7.04 4.05 2.56 3.03 6.43 4.71 4.01 4.78 3.25
1961 7.11 4.04 2.54 2.90 6.73 4.67 4.08 4.87 3.23
1962 7.18 3.76 2.51 2.96 6.41 4.63 4.12 4.72 3.19
1963 7.21 3.66 2.49 3.10 6.44 4.58 3.99 5.01 3.16
1964 7.27 3.71 2.46 3.16 6.56 4.53 4.21 4.76 3.12
1965 7.33 3.40 2.45 3.22 6.49 4.51 4.31 4.70 3.11
1966 7.35 3.41 2.45 3.25 6.64 4.50 4.39 4.88 3.10
1967 7.35 3.53 2.40 3.32 6.64 4.39 4.45 4.94 3.03
1968 7.22 3.32 2.37 3.38 6.66 4.33 4.50 4.93 2.99
Note:
The productivity measure in the table is in logarithm. Disembodied Technical Progress is the sum of the estimates of ωand
furnace- and year-specific components. The estimates of ( C ) from Table 4 are used. The TFP is share-weighted average
 of the plant level productivity measure, using furnace/plant-level output share as weight. 
Since z is the histrical cumulative output, and the first BOF was installed in 1957, no learning constribution is recorded for the year.
To construct contributions of inputs, we set the inputs of different furnaces to be the same as the OHF inputs for each year. Thus the
measure of input contributions is the mean value of x
OHFβx
s+kOHFβk
s for s = either OHF, BOF, or EF.TABLE 9
Plant-level TFP
Grouped by Furnace Technology Types
Non-upgrading Plants Upgrading Plants
Share-weighted Share-weighted Ratio
mean mean Exp( H9 - E9 )
(E9) (H9) (I9)
TFP Share TFP Share TFP Share TFP Share TFP TFP Share TFP Share TFP
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1957 10.19 6.94 10.10 7.59 8.37 5.94 - - 9.63 10.70 76.22 9.17 3.31 10.64 2.74
1958 9.94 5.28 9.95 6.64 8.36 5.11 - - 9.47 10.58 79.85 9.04 3.13 10.52 2.86
1959 10.35 5.66 10.23 6.36 8.69 5.90 - - 9.76 10.84 79.56 9.06 2.52 10.78 2.77
1960 10.46 5.03 10.28 6.03 8.87 6.44 - - 9.81 10.93 80.25 9.04 2.26 10.88 2.91
1961 10.44 5.08 10.14 5.01 9.00 6.16 9.50 3.66 9.75 10.90 77.62 9.28 2.47 10.85 3.01
1962 9.84 2.31 9.96 4.44 8.87 5.98 9.32 4.59 9.40 10.40 80.65 9.16 2.02 10.37 2.64
1963 9.92 2.05 9.97 4.50 9.08 7.53 9.63 5.20 9.53 10.24 78.73 9.24 1.99 10.22 2.00
1964 9.99 2.00 10.01 3.61 9.02 6.47 9.97 5.46 9.63 10.26 80.75 9.18 1.71 10.24 1.84
1965 9.39 1.72 10.05 3.78 9.06 6.21 9.61 9.30 9.51 10.01 77.26 9.18 1.72 9.99 1.63
1966 9.48 1.49 9.91 3.27 9.34 5.91 9.67 13.51 9.61 10.10 74.46 9.37 1.35 10.09 1.61
1967 9.54 1.32 9.98 2.83 9.46 5.19 9.60 17.34 9.61 10.19 72.22 9.34 1.09 10.18 1.76
1968 9.50 1.18 9.96 2.59 9.49 4.97 9.76 25.38 9.72 10.18 64.73 9.58 1.15 10.17 1.56
No. Plants 48 18
Note:
The productivity is obtained by averaging over furnace/plant-level productivity, weighing by output share. The productivity measure in 
the table is in logarithm.
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TFP Changes for the BOF Adopting Plants
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 Industry-level Outputs and TFP, 1957 - 1968
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